The Impact of Topology on Byzantine Containment in Stabilization by Dubois, Swan et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
00
5.
11
95
v1
  [
cs
.D
C]
  7
 M
ay
 20
10
The Impact of Topology on Byzantine Containment in Stabilization
Swan Dubois∗† Toshimitsu Masuzawa‡ Se´bastien Tixeuil§
Abstract
Self-stabilization is an versatile approach to fault-tolerance since it permits a distributed
system to recover from any transient fault that arbitrarily corrupts the contents of all memories
in the system. Byzantine tolerance is an attractive feature of distributed system that permits
to cope with arbitrary malicious behaviors.
We consider the well known problem of constructing a maximum metric tree in this context.
Combining these two properties prove difficult: we demonstrate that it is impossible to contain
the impact of Byzantine nodes in a self-stabilizing context for maximum metric tree construction
(strict stabilization). We propose a weaker containment scheme called topology-aware strict
stabilization, and present a protocol for computing maximum metric trees that is optimal for
this scheme with respect to impossibility result.
Keywords Byzantine fault, Distributed protocol, Fault tolerance, Stabilization, Spanning tree
construction
1 Introduction
The advent of ubiquitous large-scale distributed systems advocates that tolerance to various kinds of
faults and hazards must be included from the very early design of such systems. Self-stabilization [3,
5, 14] is a versatile technique that permits forward recovery from any kind of transient faults,
while Byzantine Fault-tolerance [10] is traditionally used to mask the effect of a limited number
of malicious faults. Making distributed systems tolerant to both transient and malicious faults is
appealing yet proved difficult [6, 2, 12] as impossibility results are expected in many cases.
Two main paths have been followed to study the impact of Byzantine faults in the context of
self-stabilization:
• Byzantine fault masking. In completely connected synchronous systems, one of the most
studied problems in the context of self-stabilization with Byzantine faults is that of clock
synchronization. In [1, 6], probabilistic self-stabilizing protocols were proposed for up to one
third of Byzantine processes, while in [4, 9] deterministic solutions tolerate up to one fourth
and one third of Byzantine processes, respectively.
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• Byzantine containment. For local tasks (i.e. tasks whose correctness can be checked locally,
such as vertex coloring, link coloring, or dining philosophers), the notion of strict stabilization
was proposed [12, 13, 11]. Strict stabilization guarantees that there exists a containment
radius outside which the effect of permanent faults is masked, provided that the problem
specification makes it possible to break the causality chain that is caused by the faults. As
many problems are not local, it turns out that it is impossible to provide strict stabilization
for those.
Our Contribution. In this paper, we investigate the possibility of Byzantine containment in a
self-stabilizing setting for tasks that are global (i.e. for with there exists a causality chain of size r,
where r depends on n the size of the network), and focus on a global problem, namely maximum
metric tree construction (see [7, 8]). As strict stabilization is impossible with such global tasks, we
weaken the containment constraint by relaxing the notion of containment radius to containment
area, that is Byzantine processes may disturb infinitely often a set of processes which depends on
the topology of the system and on the location of Byzantine processes.
The main contribution of this paper is to present new possibility results for containing the
influence of unbounded Byzantine behaviors. In more details, we define the notion of topology-
aware strict stabilization as the novel form of the containment and introduce containment area
to quantify the quality of the containment. The notion of topology-aware strict stabilization is
weaker than the strict stabilization but is stronger than the classical notion of self-stabilization
(i.e. every topology-aware strictly stabilizing protocol is self-stabilizing, but not necessarily strictly
stabilizing).
To demonstrate the possibility and effectiveness of our notion of topology-aware strict stabiliza-
tion, we consider maximum metric tree construction. It is shown in [12] that there exists no strictly
stabilizing protocol with a constant containment radius for this problem. In this paper, we provide
a topology-aware strictly stabilizing protocol for maximum metric tree construction and we prove
that the containment area of this protocol is optimal.
2 Distributed System
A distributed system S = (P,L) consists of a set P = {v1, v2, . . . , vn} of processes and a set L
of bidirectional communication links (simply called links). A link is an unordered pair of distinct
processes. A distributed system S can be regarded as a graph whose vertex set is P and whose link
set is L, so we use graph terminology to describe a distributed system S.
Processes u and v are called neighbors if (u, v) ∈ L. The set of neighbors of a process v is
denoted by Nv, and its cardinality (the degree of v) is denoted by ∆v(= |Nv |). The degree ∆ of a
distributed system S = (P,L) is defined as ∆ = max{∆v | v ∈ P}. We do not assume existence of
a unique identifier for each process. Instead we assume each process can distinguish its neighbors
from each other by locally arranging them in some arbitrary order: the k-th neighbor of a process
v is denoted by Nv(k) (1 ≤ k ≤ ∆v). The distance between two processes u and v is the length of
the shortest path between u and v.
In this paper, we consider distributed systems of arbitrary topology. We assume that a single
process is distinguished as a root, and all the other processes are identical.
We adopt the shared state model as a communication model in this paper, where each process
can directly read the states of its neighbors.
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The variables that are maintained by processes denote process states. A process may take
actions during the execution of the system. An action is simply a function that is executed in an
atomic manner by the process. The actions executed by each process is described by a finite set
of guarded actions of the form 〈guard〉 −→ 〈statement〉. Each guard of process u is a boolean
expression involving the variables of u and its neighbors.
A global state of a distributed system is called a configuration and is specified by a product
of states of all processes. We define C to be the set of all possible configurations of a distributed
system S. For a process set R ⊆ P and two configurations ρ and ρ′, we denote ρ
R
7→ ρ′ when ρ
changes to ρ′ by executing an action of each process in R simultaneously. Notice that ρ and ρ′
can be different only in the states of processes in R. For completeness of execution semantics, we
should clarify the configuration resulting from simultaneous actions of neighboring processes. The
action of a process depends only on its state at ρ and the states of its neighbors at ρ, and the result
of the action reflects on the state of the process at ρ′.
A schedule of a distributed system is an infinite sequence of process sets. Let Q = R1, R2, . . . be a
schedule, where Ri ⊆ P holds for each i (i ≥ 1). An infinite sequence of configurations e = ρ0, ρ1, . . .
is called an execution from an initial configuration ρ0 by a schedule Q, if e satisfies ρi−1
Ri
7→ ρi for
each i (i ≥ 1). Process actions are executed atomically, and we also assume that a distributed
daemon schedules the actions of processes, i.e. any subset of processes can simultaneously execute
their actions.
The set of all possible executions from ρ0 ∈ C is denoted by Eρ0 . The set of all possible
executions is denoted by E, that is, E =
⋃
ρ∈C Eρ. We consider asynchronous distributed systems
where we can make no assumption on schedules except that any schedule is weakly fair : every
process is contained in infinite number of subsets appearing in any schedule.
In this paper, we consider (permanent) Byzantine faults: a Byzantine process (i.e. a Byzantine-
faulty process) can make arbitrary behavior independently from its actions. If v is a Byzantine
process, v can repeatedly change its variables arbitrarily.
3 Self-Stabilizing Protocol Resilient to Byzantine Faults
Problems considered in this paper are so-called static problems, i.e. they require the system to
find static solutions. For example, the spanning-tree construction problem is a static problem,
while the mutual exclusion problem is not. Some static problems can be defined by a specification
predicate (shortly, specification), spec(v), for each process v: a configuration is a desired one (with
a solution) if every process satisfies spec(v). A specification spec(v) is a boolean expression on
variables of Pv (⊆ P ) where Pv is the set of processes whose variables appear in spec(v). The
variables appearing in the specification are called output variables (shortly, O-variables). In what
follows, we consider a static problem defined by specification spec(v).
Self-Stabilization. A self-stabilizing protocol ([3]) is a protocol that eventually reaches a legitimate
configuration, where spec(v) holds at every process v, regardless of the initial configuration. Once it
reaches a legitimate configuration, every process never changes its O-variables and always satisfies
spec(v). From this definition, a self-stabilizing protocol is expected to tolerate any number and
any type of transient faults since it can eventually recover from any configuration affected by the
transient faults. However, the recovery from any configuration is guaranteed only when every
process correctly executes its action from the configuration, i.e., we do not consider existence of
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permanently faulty processes.
Strict stabilization. When (permanent) Byzantine processes exist, Byzantine processes may not
satisfy spec(v). In addition, correct processes near the Byzantine processes can be influenced and
may be unable to satisfy spec(v). Nesterenko and Arora [12] define a strictly stabilizing protocol as
a self-stabilizing protocol resilient to unbounded number of Byzantine processes.
Given an integer c, a c-correct process is a process defined as follows.
Definition 1 (c-correct process) A process is c-correct if it is correct ( i.e. not Byzantine) and
located at distance more than c from any Byzantine process.
Definition 2 ((c, f)-containment) A configuration ρ is (c, f)-contained for specification spec if,
given at most f Byzantine processes, in any execution starting from ρ, every c-correct process v
always satisfies spec(v) and never changes its O-variables.
The parameter c of Definition 2 refers to the containment radius defined in [12]. The parameter
f refers explicitly to the number of Byzantine processes, while [12] dealt with unbounded number
of Byzantine faults (that is f ∈ {0 . . . n}).
Definition 3 ((c, f)-strict stabilization) A protocol is (c, f)-strictly stabilizing for specification
spec if, given at most f Byzantine processes, any execution e = ρ0, ρ1, . . . contains a configuration
ρi that is (c, f)-contained for spec.
An important limitation of the model of [12] is the notion of r-restrictive specifications. In-
tuitively, a specification is r-restrictive if it prevents combinations of states that belong to two
processes u and v that are at least r hops away. An important consequence related to Byzantine
tolerance is that the containment radius of protocols solving those specifications is at least r. For
some problems, such as the spanning tree construction we consider in this paper, r can not be
bounded to a constant. We can show that there exists no (o(n), 1)-strictly stabilizing protocol for
the spanning tree construction.
Topology-aware strict stabilization. In the former paragraph, we saw that there exist a number
of impossibility results on strict stabilization due to the notion of r-restrictive specifications. To
circumvent this impossibility result, we define here a new notion, which is weaker than the strict
stabilization: the topology-aware strict stabilization (denoted by TA-strict stabilization for short).
Here, the requirement to the containment radius is relaxed, i.e. the set of processes which may be
disturbed by Byzantines ones is not reduced to the union of c-neighborhood of Byzantines processes
but can be defined depending on the topology of the system and on Byzantine processes location.
In the following, we give formal definition of this new kind of Byzantine containment. From
now, B denotes the set of Byzantine processes and SB (which is function of B) denotes a subset of
V (intuitively, this set gathers all processes which may be disturbed by Byzantine processes).
Definition 4 (SB-correct node) A node is SB-correct if it is a correct node ( i.e. not Byzantine)
which not belongs to SB.
Definition 5 (SB-legitimate configuration) A configuration ρ is SB-legitimate for spec if ev-
ery SB-correct node v is legitimate for spec ( i.e. if spec(v) holds).
Definition 6 ((SB , f)-topology-aware containment) A configuration ρ0 is (SB , f)-topology-
aware contained for specification spec if, given at most f Byzantine processes, in any execution
e = ρ0, ρ1, . . ., every configuration is SB-legitimate and every SB-correct process never changes its
O-variables.
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The parameter SB of Definition 6 refers to the containment area. Any process which belongs
to this set may be infinitely disturbed by Byzantine processes. The parameter f refers explicitly
to the number of Byzantine processes.
Definition 7 ((SB , f)-topology-aware strict stabilization) A protocol is (SB , f)-topology-
aware strictly stabilizing for specification spec if, given at most f Byzantine processes, any execution
e = ρ0, ρ1, . . . contains a configuration ρi that is (SB , f)-topology-aware contained for spec.
Note that, if B denotes the set of Byzantine processes and SB = {v ∈ V |min{d(v, b), b ∈
B} ≤ c}, then a (SB , f)-topology-aware strictly stabilizing protocol is a (c, f)-strictly stabilizing
protocol. Then, a TA-strictly stabilizing protocol is generally weaker than a strictly stabilizing one,
but stronger than a classical self-stabilizing protocol (that may never meet its specification in the
presence of Byzantine processes).
The parameter SB is introduced to quantify the strength of fault containment, we do not require
each process to know the actual definition of the set. Actually, the protocol proposed in this paper
assumes no knowledge on this parameter.
4 Maximum Metric Tree Construction
In this work, we deal with maximum (routing) metric trees as defined in [8] (note that [7] provides
a self-stabilizing solution to this problem). Informally, the goal of a routing protocol is to construct
a tree that simultaneously maximizes the metric values of all of the nodes with respect to some
total ordering ≺. In the following, we recall all definitions and notations introduced in [8].
Definition 8 (Routing metric) A routing metric (or just metric) is a five-tuple (M,W,met,mr,
≺) where:
1. M is a set of metric values,
2. W is a set of edge weights,
3. met is a metric function whose domain is M ×W and whose range is M ,
4. mr is the maximum metric value in M with respect to ≺ and is assigned to the root of the
system,
5. ≺ is a less-than total order relation over M that satisfies the following three conditions for
arbitrary metric values m, m′, and m′′ in M :
(a) irreflexivity: m 6≺ m,
(b) transitivity : if m ≺ m′ and m′ ≺ m′′ then m ≺ m′′,
(c) totality: m ≺ m′ or m′ ≺ m or m = m′.
Any metric value m ∈M \{mr} satisfies the utility condition (that is, there exists w0, . . . , wk−1 in
W and m0 = mr,m1, . . . ,mk−1,mk = m in M such that ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , k},mi = met(mi−1, wi−1)).
For instance, we provide the definition of three classical metrics with this model: the shortest
path metric (SP), the flow metric (F), and the reliability metric (R).
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SP = (M1,W1,met1,mr1,≺1) F = (M2,W2,met2,mr2,≺2)
where M1 = N where mr2 ∈ N
W1 = N M2 = {0, . . . ,mr2}
met1(m,w) = m+ w W2 = {0, . . . ,mr2}
mr1 = 0 met2(m,w) = min{m,w}
≺1 is the classical > relation ≺2 is the classical < relation
R = (M3,W3,met3,mr3,≺3)
where M3 = [0, 1]
W3 = [0, 1]
met3(m,w) = m ∗ w
mr3 = 1
≺3 is the classical < relation
Definition 9 (Assigned metric) An assigned metric over a system S is a six-tuple (M,W,met,
mr,≺, wf) where (M,W,met,mr,≺) is a metric and wf is a function that assigns to each edge of
S a weight in W .
Let a rooted path (from v) be a simple path from a process v to the root r. The next set of
definitions are with respect to an assigned metric (M,W,met,mr,≺, wf) over a given system S.
Definition 10 (Metric of a rooted path) The metric of a rooted path in S is the prefix sum
of met over the edge weights in the path and mr.
For example, if a rooted path p in S is vk, . . . , v0 with v0 = r, then the metric of p is mk =
met(mk−1, wf({vk, vk−1}) with ∀i ∈ {1, k − 1},mi = met(mi−1, wf({vi, vi−1}) and m0 = mr.
Definition 11 (Maximum metric path) A rooted path p from v in S is called a maximum
metric path with respect to an assigned metric if and only if for every other rooted path q from v
in S, the metric of p is greater than or equal to the metric of q with respect to the total order ≺.
Definition 12 (Maximum metric of a node) The maximum metric of a node v 6= r (or simply
metric value of v) in S is defined by the metric of a maximum metric path from v. The maximum
metric of r is mr.
Definition 13 (Maximum metric tree) A spanning tree T of S is a maximum metric tree with
respect to an assigned metric over S if and only if every rooted path in T is a maximum metric
path in N with respect to the assigned metric.
The goal of the work of [8] is the study of metrics that always allow the construction of a
maximum metric tree. More formally, the definition follow.
Definition 14 (Maximizable metric) A metric is maximizable if and only if for any assign-
ment of this metric over any system S, there is a maximum metric tree for S with respect to the
assigned metric.
Note that [7] provides a self-stabilizing protocol to construct a maximum metric tree with
respect to any maximizable metric. Moreover, [8] provides a fully characterization of maximizable
metrics as follow.
Definition 15 (Boundedness) A metric (M,W,met,mr,≺) is bounded if and only if: ∀m ∈
M,∀w ∈W,met(m,w) ≺ m or met(m,w) = m
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Figure 1: Examples of containment areas for SP spanning tree construction.
Definition 16 (Monotonicity) A metric (M,W,met,mr,≺) is monotonic if and only if: ∀(m,
m′) ∈M2,∀w ∈W,m ≺ m′ ⇒ (met(m,w) ≺ met(m′, w) or met(m,w) = met(m′, w))
Theorem 1 (Characterization of maximizable metrics [8]) A metric is maximizable if and
only if this metric is bounded and monotonic.
Given a maximizable metric M = (M,W,mr,met,≺), the aim of this work is to construct a
maximum metric tree with respect to M which spans the system in a self-stabilizing way in a
system subject to permanent Byzantine failures. It is obvious that these Byzantine processes may
disturb some correct processes. It is why, we relax the problem in the following way: we want to
construct a maximum metric forest with respect to M. The root of any tree of this forest must be
either the real root or a Byzantine process.
Each process v has three O-variables: a pointer to its parent in its tree (prntv ∈ Nv ∪ {⊥}), a
level which stores its current metric value (levelv ∈M), and a variable which stores its distance to
the root of its tree (distv ∈ {0, . . . ,D}). Obviously, Byzantine process may disturb (at least) their
neighbors. We use the following specification of the problem.
We introduce new notations as follows. Given an assigned metric (M,W,met,mr,≺, wf) over
the system S and two processes u and v, we denote by µ(u, v) the maximum metric of node u when
v plays the role of the root of the system and by wu,v the weight of the edge {u, v} (that is, the
value of wf({u, v})).
Definition 17 (M-path) Given an assigned metric M = (M,W,mr,met,≺, wf) over a system
S, a path (v0, . . . , vk) (k ≥ 1) of S is a M-path if and only if:
1. prntv0 = ⊥, levelv0 = 0, distv0 = 0, and v0 ∈ B ∪ {r},
2. ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, prntvi = vi−1, levelvi = met(levelvi−1 , wvi,vi−1), and distvi = i,
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Figure 2: Examples of containment areas for flow spanning tree construction.
3. ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , k},met(levelvi−1 , wvi,vi−1) = max≺
u∈Nv
{met(levelu, wvi,u)}, and
4. levelvk = µ(vk, v0).
We define the specification predicate spec(v) of the maximum metric tree construction with
respect to a maximizable metric M as follows.
spec(v) :
{
prntv = ⊥, levelv = 0, and distv = 0 if v is the root r
there exists a M-path (v0, . . . , vk) such that vk = v otherwise
Following discussion of Section 3, it is obvious that there exists no strictly stabilizing protocol
for this problem. It is why we consider the weaker notion of topology-aware strict stabilization.
First, we show an impossibility result in order to define the best possible containment area. Then,
we provide a maximum metric tree construction protocol which is (SB, f)-TA-strictly stabilizing
where f ≤ n− 1 which match these optimal containment area, namely:
SB = {v ∈ V \B |µ(v, r)  max≺{µ(v, b), b ∈ B}} \ {r}
Figures from 1 to 3 provide some examples of containment areas with respect to several maxi-
mizable metrics.
We introduce here a new definition that is used in the following.
Definition 18 (Fixed point) A metric value m is a fixed point of a metricM = (M,W,mr,met,
≺) if m ∈M and if for any value w ∈W , we have: met(m,w) = m.
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Figure 3: Examples of containment areas for reliability spanning tree construction.
4.1 Impossibility Result
In this section, we show that there exists some constraints on the containment area of any topology-
aware strictly stabilizing for the maximum metric tree construction depending on the metric.
Theorem 2 Given a maximizable metric M = (M,W,mr,met,≺), even under the central dae-
mon, there exists no (AB , 1)-TA-strictly stabilizing protocol for maximum metric spanning tree
construction with respect to M where AB  SB.
Proof Let M = (M,W,mr,met,≺) be a maximizable metric and P be a (AB , 1)-TA-strictly
stabilizing protocol for maximum metric spanning tree construction protocol with respect to M
where AB  SB. We must distinguish the following cases:
Case 1: |M | = 1.
Denote by m the metric value such thatM = {m}. For any system and for any process v 6= r,
we have µ(v, r) = min≺
b∈B
{µ(v, b)} = m. Consequently, SB = V \ (B ∪ {r}) for any system.
Consider the following system: V = {r, u, v, b} and E = {{r, u}, {u, v}, {v, b}} (b is a Byzan-
tine process). As SB = {u, v} and AB  SB, we have: u /∈ AB or v /∈ AB . Con-
sider now the following configuration ρ00: prntr = prntb = ⊥, prntv = b, prntu = v,
levelr = levelu = levelv = levelb = m, distr = distb = 0, distv = 1 and distu = 2 (see
Figure 4, other variables may have arbitrary values). Note that ρ00 is AB-legitimate for spec
(whatever AB is).
Assume now that b behaves as a correct process with respect to P. Then, by convergence of
P in a fault-free system starting from ρ00 which is not legitimate (remember that a strictly-
stabilizing protocol is a special case of self-stabilizing protocol), we can deduce that the system
reaches in a finite time a configuration ρ01 (see Figure 4) in which: prntr = ⊥, prntu = r,
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Figure 4: Configurations used in proof of Theorem 2.
prntv = u, prntb = v, levelr = levelu = levelv = levelb = m, distr = 0, distu = 1, distv = 2
and distb = 3. Note that processes u and v modify their O-variables in this execution. This
contradicts the (AB , 1)-TA-strict stabilization of P (whatever AB is).
Case 2: |M | ≥ 2.
By definition of a bounded metric, we can deduce that there exist m ∈ M and w ∈ W such
that m = met(mr,w) ≺ mr. Then, we must distinguish the following cases:
Case 2.1: m is a fixed point of M.
Consider the following system: V = {r, u, v, b}, E = {{r, u}, {u, v}, {v, b}}, wr,u = wv,b =
w, and wu,v = w
′ (b is a Byzantine process). As for any w′ ∈ W , met(m,w′) = m (by
definition of a fixed point), we have: SB = {u, v}. Since AB  SB , we have: u /∈ AB or
v /∈ AB. Consider now the following configuration ρ
1
0: prntr = prntb = ⊥, prntv = b,
prntu = v, levelr = levelb = mr, levelu = levelv = m, distr = distb = 0, distv = 1
and distu = 2 (see Figure 4, other variables may have arbitrary values). Note that ρ
1
0 is
AB-legitimate for spec (whatever AB is).
Assume now that b behaves as a correct process with respect to P. Then, by convergence
of P in a fault-free system starting from ρ10 which is not legitimate (remember that a
strictly-stabilizing protocol is a special case of self-stabilizing protocol), we can deduce
that the system reaches in a finite time a configuration ρ11 (see Figure 4) in which:
prntr = ⊥, prntu = r, prntv = u, prntb = v, levelr = mr, levelu = levelv = levelb = m
(since m is a fixed point), distr = 0, distu = 1, distv = 2 and distb = 3. Note
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that processes u and v modify their O-variables in this execution. This contradicts the
(AB , 1)-TA-strict stabilization of P (whatever AB is).
Case 2.2: m is not a fixed point of M.
This implies that there exists w′ ∈W such that: met(m,w′) ≺ m (remember that M is
bounded). Consider the following system: V = {r, u, v, v′, b}, E = {{r, u}, {u, v}, {u, v′},
{v, b}, {v′, b}}, wr,u = wv,b = wv′,b = w, and wu,v = wu,v′ = w
′ (b is a Byzantine
process). We can see that SB = {v, v
′}. Since AB  SB , we have: v /∈ AB or v
′ /∈ AB .
Consider now the following configuration ρ20: prntr = prntb = ⊥, prntv = prntv′ = b,
prntu = r, levelr = levelb = mr, levelu = levelv = levelv′ = m, distr = distb = 0,
distv = distv′ = 1 and distu = 1 (see Figure 4, other variables may have arbitrary
values). Note that ρ20 is AB-legitimate for spec (whatever AB is).
Assume now that b behaves as a correct process with respect to P. Then, by convergence
of P in a fault-free system starting from ρ20 which is not legitimate (remember that a
strictly-stabilizing protocol is a special case of self-stabilizing protocol), we can deduce
that the system reaches in a finite time a configuration ρ21 (see Figure 4) in which:
prntr = ⊥, prntu = r, prntv = prntv′ = u, prntb = v (or prntb = v
′), levelr = mr,
levelu = m levelv = levelv′ = met(m,w
′) = m′, levelb = met(m
′, w) = m′′, distr = 0,
distu = 1, distv = distv′ = 2 and distb = 3. Note that processes v and v
′ modify their
O-variables in this execution. This contradicts the (AB , 1)-TA-strict stabilization of P
(whatever AB is).

4.2 Topology-Aware Strict Stabilizing Protocol
In this section, we provide our self-stabilizing protocol that achieve optimal containment areas to
permanent Byzantine failures for constructing a maximum metric tree for any maximizable metric
M = (M,W,met,mr,≺). More formally, our protocol is (SB , f)-strictly stabilizing, that is optimal
with respect to the result of Theorem 2. Our protocol is borrowed from the one of [7] (which is
self-stabilizing). The key idea of this protocol is to use the distance variable (upper bounded by
a given constant D) to detect and break cycles of process which has the same maximum metric.
The main modification we bring to this protocol follows. In the initial protocol, when a process
modifies its parent, it chooses arbitrarily one of the ”better” neighbors (with respect to the metric).
To achieve the (SB , f)-TA-strict stabilization, we must ensures a fair selection along the set of its
neighbor. We perform this fairness with a round-robin order along the set of neighbors. Our
solution is presented as Algorithm 4.1.
In the following, we provide the proof of the TA-strict stabilization of SSMAX . Remember
that the real root r can not be a Byzantine process by hypothesis. Note that the subsystem whose
set of nodes is V \ SB is connected respectively by boundedness of the metric.
Lemma 1 For any process v ∈ V , we have:
∀u ∈ Nv,met
(
max≺
p∈B∪{r}
{µ(u, p)}, wu,v
)
 max≺
p∈B∪{r}
{µ(v, p)}
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algorithm 4.1 SSMAX : A TA-strictly stabilizing protocol for maximum metric tree construction.
Data:
Nv: totally ordered set of neighbors of v.
D: upper bound of the number of processes in a simple path.
Variables:
prntv
{
= ⊥ if v = r
∈ Nv if v 6= r
: pointer on the parent of v in the tree.
levelv ∈ {m ∈M |m  mr}: metric of the node.
distv ∈ {0, . . . ,D}: distance to the root.
Macro:
For any subset A ⊆ Nv, choose(A) returns the first element of A which is bigger than prntv (in a round-robin fashion).
Rules:
(Rr) :: (v = r) ∧ ((levelv 6= mr) ∨ (distv 6= 0)) −→ levelv := mr; distv := 0
(R1) :: (v 6= r) ∧ (prntv ∈ Nv) ∧ ((distv 6= min(distprntv + 1, D)) ∨ (levelv 6= met(levelprntv , wv,prntv )))
−→ distv := min(distprntv + 1, D); levelv := met(levelprntv , wv,prntv)
(R2) :: (v 6= r) ∧ (distv = D) ∧ (∃u ∈ Nv, distu < D − 1)
−→ prntv := choose({u ∈ Nv|distv < D − 1}); distv := distprntv + 1; levelv := met(levelprntv , wv,prntv )
(R3) :: (v 6= r) ∧ (∃u ∈ Nv, (distu < D − 1) ∧ (levelv ≺ met(levelu, wu,v)))
−→ prntv := choose
({
u ∈ Nv
∣∣∣(levelu < D−1)∧(met(levelu , wu,v) = max≺
q∈Nv/levelq<D−1
{met(levelq , wq,v)})
})
;
levelv := met(levelprntv , wprntv,v); distv := distprntv + 1
Proof Let v ∈ V be a process. By contradiction, assume that there exists a neighbor u of v such
that:
max≺
p∈B∪{r}
{µ(v, p)} ≺ met
(
max≺
p∈B∪{r}
{µ(u, p)}, wu,v
)
Let q ∈ B ∪ {r} one of the process such that max≺
p∈B∪{r}
{µ(u, p)} = µ(u, q). Then, we have:
max≺
p∈B∪{r}
{µ(v, p)} ≺ met(µ(u, q), wu,v) by construction of q
≺ µ(v, q) since met(µ(u, q), wu,v)  µ(v, q)
This contradicts the fact that q ∈ B ∪ {r} and shows us the result. 
Given a configuration ρ ∈ C and a metric value m ∈M , let us define the following predicate:
IMm(ρ) ≡ ∀v ∈ V, levelv  max≺
{
m, max≺
u∈B∪{r}
{µ(v, u)}
}
Lemma 2 For any metric value m ∈M , the predicate IMm is closed by actions of SSMAX .
Proof Let m be a metric value (m ∈M). Let ρ ∈ C be a configuration such that IMm(ρ) = true
and ρ′ ∈ C be a configuration such that ρ
R
7→ ρ′ is a step of SSMAX .
If the root process r ∈ R (respectively a Byzantine process b ∈ R), then we have levelr = mr
(respectively levelb  mr) in ρ
′ by construction of (Rr) (respectively by definition of levelb). Hence,
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levelr  max≺
{
m, max≺
u∈B∪{r}
{µ(r, u)}
}
= mr (respectively levelb  max≺
{
m, max≺
u∈B∪{r}
{µ(b, u)}
}

mr).
If a correct process v ∈ R with v 6= r, then there exists a neighbor p of v such that levelp 
max≺
{
m, max≺
u∈B∪{r}
{µ(p, u)}
}
in ρ (since IM(ρ) = true) and prntv = p and levelv = met(levelp,
wv,p) in ρ
′ (since v is activated during this step).
If we apply the Lemma 1 to met and to neighbor p, we obtain the following property:
met
(
max≺
u∈B∪{r}
{µ(p, u)}, wv,p
)
 max≺
u∈B∪{r}
{µ(v, u)}
Consequently, we obtain that, in ρ′:
levelv = met(levelp, wv,p)
 met
(
max≺
{
m, max≺
u∈B∪{r}
{µ(p, u)}
}
, wv,p
)
by boundedness of M
 max≺
{
met(m,wv,p),met
(
max≺
u∈B∪{r}
{µ(p, u)}, wv,p
)}
 max≺
{
m, max≺
u∈B∪{r}
{µ(v, u)}
}
since met(m,wv,p)  m
We can deduce that IMd(ρ
′) = true, that concludes the proof. 
Given an assigned metric to a system G, we can observe that the set of metrics value M is
finite and that we can label elements of M by m0 = mr,m1, . . . ,mk in a way such that ∀i ∈
{0, . . . , k − 1},mi+1 ≺ mi.
We introduce the following notations:
∀mi ∈M, Pmi =
{
v ∈ V \ SB
∣∣µ(v, r) = mi}
∀mi ∈M, Vmi =
i⋃
j=0
Pmj
∀mi ∈M, Imi =
{
v ∈ V
∣∣ max≺
u∈B∪{r}
{µ(v, u)} ≺ mi
}
∀mi ∈M, LCmi =
{
ρ ∈ C
∣∣(∀v ∈ Vmi , spec(v)) ∧ (IMmi(ρ))}
LC = LCmk
Lemma 3 For any mi ∈M , the set LCmi is closed by actions of SSMAX .
Proof Let mi be a metric value from M and ρ be a configuration of LCmi . By construction, any
process v ∈ Vmi satisfies spec(v) in ρ.
In particular, the root process satisfies: prntr = ⊥, levelr = mr, and distr = 0. By construction
of SSMAX , r is not enabled and then never modifies its O-variables (since the guard of the rule
of r does not involve the state of its neighbors).
In the same way, any process v ∈ Vmi satisfies: prntv ∈ Nv, levelv = met(levelprntv , wprntv,v),
distv = distprntv + 1, and levelv = max≺
u∈Nv
{met(levelu, wu,v)}. Note that, as v ∈ Vmi and spec(v)
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holds in ρ, we have: levelv = µ(v, r) = max≺
p∈B∪{r}
{µ(v, p)} and distv ≤ D − 1 by construction of D.
Hence, process v is not enabled in ρ.
Assume that there exists a process v ∈ Vmi that take a step ρ
′ R7→ ρ′′ in an execution starting
from ρ (without loss of generality, assume that v is the first process of v ∈ Vmi that takes a step in
this execution). Then, we know that v 6= r. This activation implies that a neighbor u /∈ Vmi (since
v is the first process of Vmi to take a step) of v modified its levelu variable to a metric value m ∈M
such that levelv ≺ met(m,wu,v) in ρ
′ (note that O-variables of v and prntv remain consistent since
v is the first process to take a step in this execution).
Hence, we have levelv = max≺
p∈B∪{r}
{µ(v, p)} ≺ met(m,wu,v). Moreover, the closure of IMB (es-
tablished in Lemma 2) ensures us thatm  max≺
p∈B∪{r}
{µ(u, p)}. By boundedness ofM, we can deduce
that met(m,wu,v)  met( max≺
p∈B∪{r}
{µ(u, p)}, wu,v). Consequently, we obtain that max≺
p∈B∪{r}
{µ(v, p)} ≺
met( max≺
p∈B∪{r}
{µ(u, p)}, wu,v). This is contradictory with the result of Lemma 1.
In conclusion, any process v ∈ Vmi takes no step in any execution starting from ρ and then
always satisfies spec(v). Then, the closure of IMB (established in Lemma 2) concludes the proof.

Lemma 4 Any configuration of LC is (SB , n− 1)-TA contained for spec.
Proof This is a direct application of the Lemma 3 to LC = LCmi . 
Lemma 5 Starting from any configuration of C, any execution of SSMAX reaches in a finite
time a configuration of LCmr.
Proof Let ρ be an arbitrary configuration. Then, it is obvious that IMmr(ρ) is satisfied. By closure
of IMmr (proved in Lemma 2), we know that IMmr remains satisfied in any execution starting from
ρ.
If r does not satisfy spec(r) in ρ, then r is continuously enabled. Since the scheduling is weakly
fair, r is activated in a finite time and then r satisfies spec(r) in a finite time. Denote by ρ′ the first
configuration in which spec(r) holds. Note that r takes no step in any execution starting from ρ′.
The boundedness of M implies that Pmr induces a connected subsystem. If Pmr = {r}, then
we proved that ρ′ ∈ LCmr and we have the result.
Otherwise, observe that, for any configuration of an execution starting from ρ′, if all processes
of Pmr are not enabled, then all processes v of Pmr satisfy spec(v). Assume now that there exists
an execution e starting from ρ′ in which some processes of Pmr takes infinitely many steps. By
construction, at least one of these processes (note it v) has a neighbor u which takes only a finite
number of steps in e (recall that Pmr induces a connected subsystem and that r takes no step in
e). After u takes its last step of e, we can observe that levelu = mr and distu < D − 1 (otherwise,
u is activated in a finite time that contradicts its construction).
As v can execute consequently (R1) only a finite number of times (since the incrementation of
distv is bounded by D), we can deduce that v executes (R2) or (R3) infinitely often. In both cases,
u belongs to the set which is the parameter of function choose. By the fairness of this function, we
can deduce that prntv = u in a finite time in e. Then, the construction of u implies that v is never
enabled in the sequel of e. This is contradictory with the construction of e.
Consequently, any execution starting from ρ′ reaches in a finite time a configuration such that
all processes of Pmr are not enabled. We can deduce that this configuration belongs to LCmr, that
ends the proof. 
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Lemma 6 For any mi ∈ M and for any configuration ρ ∈ LCmi , any execution of SSMAX
starting from ρ reaches in a finite time a configuration such that:
∀v ∈ Imi , levelv = mi ⇒ distv = D
Proof Let mi be an arbitrary metric value of M and ρ0 be an arbitrary configuration of LCmi .
Let e = ρ0, ρ1, . . . be an execution starting from ρ0.
Note that ρ0 satisfies IMmi by construction. Hence, we have ∀v ∈ Imi , levelv  mi. The closure
of IMmi (proved in Lemma 2) ensures us that this property is satisfied in any configuration of e.
If any process v ∈ Imi satisfies levelv ≺ mi in ρ0, then the result is obvious. Otherwise, we
define the following variant function. For any configuration ρj of e, we denote by Aj the set of
processes v of Imi such that levelv = mi in ρj. Then, we define f(ρj) = min
v∈Aj
{distv}. We will prove
the result by showing that there exists an integer k such that f(ρk) = D.
First, if a process v joins Aj (that is, v /∈ Aj−1 but v ∈ Aj), then it takes a distance value
greater or equals to f(ρj+1) by construction of the protocol. We can deduce that the fact that
some processes join Aj does not decrease f . Moreover, the construction of the protocol implies
that a process v such that v ∈ Aj and v ∈ Aj+1 can not decrease its distance value in the step
ρj 7→ ρj+1.
Then, consider for a given configuration ρj a process v ∈ Aj such that distv = f(ρj) < D. We
distinguish the following cases:
Case 1: levelv = met(levelprntv , wv,prntv )
The fact that v ∈ Imi , the boundedness ofM and the closure of IMmi imply that prntv ∈ Aj
(and, hence that levelprntv = mi). Then, by construction of f(ρj), we know that distv 6=
distprntv + 1 (otherwise, we do not have distv = f(ρj) since prntv has a smaller distance
value). Consequently, v is enabled by (R1) in ρj and distv increase of at least 1 during the
step ρj 7→ ρj+1 if this rule is executed.
Case 2: levelv 6= met(levelprntv , wv,prntv )
The rule (R1) is then enabled for v. If this rule is executed during the step ρj 7→ ρj+1, one
of the two following sub cases appears.
Case 2.1: met(levelprntv , wv,prntv ) ≺ mi
Then, v does not belong to Aj+1 by definition.
Case 2.2: met(levelprntv , wv,prntv ) = mi
Remind that the closure of IMmi implies then that levelprntv = mi. By construction of
f(ρj), we have distprntv ≥ f(ρj) in ρj. Then, we can see that distv increases of at least
1 during the step ρj 7→ ρj+1.
In all cases, v is enabled by (R1) in ρj and the execution of this rule either increases strictly
distv or removes v from Aj+1.
As Imi is finite and the scheduling is weakly fair, we can deduce that f increases in a finite time
in any execution starting from ρj. By repeating the argument at most D times, we can deduce
that e contains a configuration ρk such that f(ρk) = D, that shows the result. 
Lemma 7 For any mi ∈M and for any configuration ρ ∈ LCmi such that ∀v ∈ Imi , levelv = mi ⇒
distv = D, any execution of SSMAX starting from ρ reaches in a finite time a configuration such
that:
∀v ∈ Imi , levelv ≺ mi
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Proof Let mi ∈ M be an arbitrary metric value and ρ0 be a configuration of LCmi such that
∀v ∈ Imi , levelv = mi ⇒ distv = D. Let e = ρ0, ρ1, . . . be an arbitrary execution starting from ρ0.
For any configuration ρj of e, let us denote Eρj = {v ∈ Imi |levelv = mi}. By the closure of
IMmi (which holds by definition in ρ0) established in Lemma 2, we obtain the result if there exists
a configuration ρj of e such that Eρj = ∅.
If there exists some processes v ∈ Imi \ Eρ0 (and hence levelv ≺ mi) such that prntv ∈ Eρ0
and met(levelprntv , wv,prntv ) = mi in ρ0, then we can observe that these processes are continuously
enabled by (R1). As the scheduling is weakly fair, v activates this rule in a finite time and
then, levelv = mi and distv = D. In other words, v joins Eρl for a given integer l. We can
conclude that there exists an integer k such that for any v ∈ Imi \ Eρ0 , either prntv /∈ Eρk or
met(levelprntv , wv,prntv ) ≺ mi.
Then, we prove that, for any integer j ≥ k, we have Eρj+1 ⊆ Eρj . For the sake of contradiction,
assume that there exists an integer j ≥ k and a process v ∈ Imi such that v ∈ Eρj+1 and v /∈ Eρj .
Without loss of generality, assume that j is the smallest integer which performs these properties.
Let us study the following cases:
Case 1: If v activates (R1) during the step ρj 7→ ρj+1, then we know that prntv /∈ Eρj in ρj
(otherwise, we have a contradiction with the fact that v ∈ Eρj+1). But in this case, we have:
levelprntv ≺ mi. The boundedness of M implies that levelv ≺ mi in ρj+1 that contradicts
the fact that v ∈ Eρj+1 .
Case 2: If v activates either (R2) or (R3) during the step ρj 7→ ρj+1, then v chooses a new
parent which has a distance smaller than D− 1 in ρj . This implies that this new parent does
not belongs to Eρj . Then, we have levelprntv ≺ mi. The boundedness of M implies that
levelv ≺ mi in ρj+1 that contradicts the fact that v ∈ Eρj+1 .
In the two cases, our claim is satisfied. In other words, there exists a point of the execution
afterwards the set E can not grow (this implies that, if a process leave the set E, it is a definitive
leaving).
Assume now that there exists a step ρj 7→ ρj+1 (with j ≥ k) such that a process v ∈ Eρj is
activated. Observe that the closure of IMmi implies that v can not be activated by the rule (R3).
If v activates (R1) during this step, then v modifies its level during this step (otherwise, we have
a contradiction with the fact that levelprntv = mi ⇒ distv = D). The closure of IMmi implies
that v leaves the set E during this step. If v activates (R2) during this step, then v chooses a new
parent which has a distance smaller than D − 1 in ρj . This implies that this new parent does not
belongs to Eρj . Then, we have levelprntv ≺ mi. The boundedness of M implies that levelv ≺ mi
in ρj+1. In other words, if a process of Eρj is activated during the step ρj 7→ ρj+1, then it satisfies
v /∈ Eρj+1 .
Finally, observe that the construction of the protocol and the construction of the bound D
ensures us that any process v ∈ Imi such that distv = D is activated in a finite time. In conclusion,
we obtain that there exists an integer j such that Eρj = ∅, that implies the result. 
Lemma 8 For any mi ∈ M and for any configuration ρ ∈ LCmi , any execution of SSMAX
starting from ρ reaches in a finite time a configuration ρ′ such that IMmi+1 holds.
Proof This result is a direct consequence of Lemmas 6 and 7. 
Lemma 9 For any mi ∈ M and for any configuration ρ ∈ LCmi , any execution of SSMAX
starting from ρ reaches in a finite time a configuration of LCmi+1 .
16
Proof Let mi be a metric value of M and ρ be an arbitrary configuration of LCmi . We know by
Lemma 8 that any execution starting from ρ reaches in a finite time a configuration ρ′ such that
IMmi+1 holds. By closure of IM and of LCmi (established respectively in Lemma 2 and 3), we know
that any configuration of any execution starting from ρ′ belongs to LCmi and satisfies IMmi+1 .
We know that Vmi 6= ∅ since r ∈ Vmi for any i ≥ 0. Remind that Vmi+1 is connected by the
boundedness of M. Then, we know that there exists at least one process p of Pmi+1 which has a
neighbor q in Vmi such that µ(p, r) = met(µ(q, r), wp,q). Moreover, Lemma 3 ensures us that any
process of Vmi takes no step in any executions tarting from ρ
′.
Observe that, for any configuration of an execution starting from ρ′, if all processes of Pmi+1 are
not enabled, then all processes v of Pmi+1 satisfy spec(v). Assume now that there exists an execution
e starting from ρ′ in which some processes of Pmi+1 take infinitely many steps. By construction,
at least one of these processes (note it v) has a neighbor u such that µ(v, r) = met(µ(u, r), wv,u)
which takes only a finite number of steps in e (recall the construction of p). After u takes its last
step of e, we can observe that levelu = µ(u, r) and distu < D − 1 (otherwise, u is activated in a
finite time that contradicts its construction).
As v can execute consequently (R1) only a finite number of times (since the incrementation of
distv is bounded by D), we can deduce that v executes (R2) or (R3) infinitely often. In both cases,
u belongs to the set which is the parameter of function choose (remind that IMmi+1 is satisfied and
that u has the better possible metric along v’s neighbors). By the construction of this function, we
can deduce that prntv = u in a finite time in e. Then, the construction of u implies that v is never
enabled in the sequel of e. This is contradictory with the construction of e.
Consequently, any execution starting from ρ′ reaches in a finite time a configuration such that
all processes of Pmi+1 are not enabled. We can deduce that this configuration belongs to LCmi+1 ,
that ends the proof. 
Lemma 10 Starting from any configuration, any execution of SSMAX reaches a configuration
of LC in a finite time.
Proof Let ρ be an arbitrary configuration. We know by Lemma 5 that any execution starting
from ρ reaches in a finite time a configuration of LCmr = LCm0 . Then, we can apply at most k
times the result of Lemma 9 to obtain that any execution starting from ρ reaches in a finite time
a configuration of LCmk = LC, that proves the result. 
Theorem 3 SSMAX is a (SB , n− 1)-TA-strictly stabilizing protocol for spec.
Proof This result is a direct consequence of Lemmas 4 and 10. 
Note that Theorem 2 ensures us that SB is the optimal containment area for a topology-aware
strictly stabilizing protocol for spec.
5 Conclusion
We introduced a new notion of Byzantine containment in self-stabilization: the topology-aware
strict stabilization. This notion relaxes the constraint on the containment radius of the strict
stabilization to a containment area. In other words, the set of correct processes which may be
infinitely often disturbed by Byzantine processes is a function depending on the topology of the
system and on the actual location of Byzantine processes. We illustrated the relevance of this
notion by providing a topology-aware strictly stabilizing protocol for the maximum metric tree
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construction problem which does not admit strictly stabilizing solution. Moreover, our protocol
performs the optimal containment area with respect to the topology-aware strict stabilization.
Our work raises some opening questions. Number of problems do not accept strictly stabilizing
solution. Does any of them admit a topology-aware strictly stabilizing solution ? Is it possible
to give a necessary and/or sufficient condition for a problem to admit a topology-aware strictly
stabilizing solution ? What happens if we consider only bounded Byzantine behavior ?
References
[1] Michael Ben-Or, Danny Dolev, and Ezra N. Hoch. Fast self-stabilizing byzantine tolerant
digital clock synchronization. In Rida A. Bazzi and Boaz Patt-Shamir, editors, PODC, pages
385–394. ACM, 2008.
[2] Ariel Daliot and Danny Dolev. Self-stabilization of byzantine protocols. In Ted Herman and
Se´bastien Tixeuil, editors, Self-Stabilizing Systems, volume 3764 of Lecture Notes in Computer
Science, pages 48–67. Springer, 2005.
[3] Edsger W. Dijkstra. Self-stabilizing systems in spite of distributed control. Commun. ACM,
17(11):643–644, 1974.
[4] Danny Dolev and Ezra N. Hoch. On self-stabilizing synchronous actions despite byzantine
attacks. In Andrzej Pelc, editor, DISC, volume 4731 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science,
pages 193–207. Springer, 2007.
[5] S. Dolev. Self-stabilization. MIT Press, March 2000.
[6] Shlomi Dolev and Jennifer L. Welch. Self-stabilizing clock synchronization in the presence of
byzantine faults. J. ACM, 51(5):780–799, 2004.
[7] Mohamed G. Gouda and Marco Schneider. Stabilization of maximal metric trees. In Anish
Arora, editor, WSS, pages 10–17. IEEE Computer Society, 1999.
[8] Mohamed G. Gouda and Marco Schneider. Maximizable routing metrics. IEEE/ACM Trans.
Netw., 11(4):663–675, 2003.
[9] Ezra N. Hoch, Danny Dolev, and Ariel Daliot. Self-stabilizing byzantine digital clock synchro-
nization. In Ajoy Kumar Datta and Maria Gradinariu, editors, SSS, volume 4280 of Lecture
Notes in Computer Science, pages 350–362. Springer, 2006.
[10] Leslie Lamport, Robert E. Shostak, and Marshall C. Pease. The byzantine generals problem.
ACM Trans. Program. Lang. Syst., 4(3):382–401, 1982.
[11] Toshimitsu Masuzawa and Se´bastien Tixeuil. Stabilizing link-coloration of arbitrary networks
with unbounded byzantine faults. International Journal of Principles and Applications of
Information Science and Technology (PAIST), 1(1):1–13, December 2007.
[12] Mikhail Nesterenko and Anish Arora. Tolerance to unbounded byzantine faults. In 21st
Symposium on Reliable Distributed Systems (SRDS 2002), page 22. IEEE Computer Society,
2002.
18
[13] Yusuke Sakurai, Fukuhito Ooshita, and Toshimitsu Masuzawa. A self-stabilizing link-coloring
protocol resilient to byzantine faults in tree networks. In Principles of Distributed Systems, 8th
International Conference, OPODIS 2004, volume 3544 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science,
pages 283–298. Springer, 2005.
[14] Se´bastien Tixeuil. Algorithms and Theory of Computation Handbook, Second Edition, chapter
Self-stabilizing Algorithms, pages 26.1–26.45. Chapman & Hall/CRC Applied Algorithms and
Data Structures. CRC Press, Taylor & Francis Group, November 2009.
19
